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Abstract
Is the mechanism behind presupposition projection and filtering fundamentally
asymmetric or symmetric? This is a foundational question for the theory of presup-
position which has been at the centre of attention in the literature recently (Schlenker
2008b, 2009; Rothschild 2011/2015 a.o.). It also bears on broader issues concerning
the source of asymmetries observed in natural language: are these simply rooted
in superficial asymmetries of language use (since language use unfolds in time,
which we experience as fundamentally asymmetric) or are they, at least in part,
directly encoded in linguistic knowledge and representations? In this paper we aim
to make progress on these questions by exploring presupposition projection across
conjunction, which has typically been taken as a central piece of evidence that pre-
supposition filtering is asymmetric in general. As a number of authors have recently
pointed out, however, the evidence which has typically been used to support this
conclusion is muddied by independent issues concerning judgments of redundancy,
and additional concerns arise with regards to the possibility of local accommodation.
We report on a series of experiments, building on previous work by Chemla &
Schlenker (2012); Schwarz (2015), using inference and acceptability tasks, which
aim to control for both of these potential confounds. In our results, we find strong ev-
idence for asymmetric left-to-right filtering across conjunctions, but no evidence for
right-to-left filtering—even when right-to-left filtering would, if available, rescue an
otherwise unacceptable sentence. These results suggest that presupposition filtering
across conjunction is indeed asymmetric, contra suggestions in the recent literature
(Schlenker 2008a, 2009 a.o.) and paves the way for the investigation of further
questions about the nature of this asymmetry and presupposition projection more
generally. Our results also have broader methodological and theoretical implications:
we find important differences in the verdicts of acceptability versus inference tasks
in testing for projected content, which has both methodological ramifications for the
question of how to distinguish presupposed content, and theoretical repercussions
for understanding the nature of projection and presuppositions more generally.
Keywords: presupposition projection, asymmetry, semantics-pragmatics interface, experi-
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1 Introduction
Is the mechanism behind presupposition projection and filtering fundamentally
asymmetric, or does it allow for symmetric effects? That is, when processing pre-
suppositions and determining whether they project, can we take into account only
material that precedes a presupposition trigger, or can we also access material that
follows the trigger? This is a foundational question for the theory of presupposition
which has been at the centre of attention in the literature recently and also bears on
broader issues concerning the sources of asymmetries observed in natural language:
are these rooted in superficial asymmetries of language use (since language use
unfolds in time, which we experience as fundamentally asymmetric) or can they be
directly referenced in linguistic knowledge and representations?1
In this paper we aim to make progress on these questions by exploring presup-
position projection and filtering across conjunction. The case of conjunction has
typically been taken as a central piece of evidence that presupposition filtering is
asymmetric in general: that is, that presuppositions can be filtered by material to
their left, but not by material to their right. Recent work has argued, however that
the evidence based on intuitions is much less clear than commonly assumed once
we take into account independent issues of redundancy (Schlenker 2009; Rothschild
2011/2015; Chemla & Schlenker 2012). In addition, intuitions about the role of
order in filtering across conjunction are muddied by the possibility of local accom-
modation. The question of the role of order for filtering in conjunction thus remains
open.
We report on a series of experiments which aim to address this question using in-
ference and acceptability tasks, controlling for redundancy and local accommodation,
building on the previous work by Chemla & Schlenker (2012) and Schwarz (2015).
In our results, we find strong evidence for left-to-right filtering across conjunctions,
but no evidence for right-to-left filtering, even when it would rescue an otherwise un-
acceptable sentence. We argue that these results suggest that presupposition filtering
across conjunction indeed is only asymmetric.
1 See Schlenker 2008a, 2009; Fox 2008; Rothschild 2011/2015; Chemla & Schlenker 2012; Mandelkern
& Romoli 2017b for discussion. We will use ‘left-to-right’ or ‘right-to-left’ to describe the potential
order effects without making a commitment as to whether the relevant order is linear or hierarchical
(since these coincide in the case of conjunction, it makes no difference for our purposes). For further
discussion, see Romoli & Mandelkern 2016; Chung 2017; Chierchia 2009; Ingason 2016; George
2008; see also the conclusion below.
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows: after setting the stage with some
essential background, we report the individual experiments in turn. We then turn
to a general discussion of the upshot of the overall experimental results, as well as
methodological implications, comparisons to past work in the literature, and avenues
for future research.
2 Background
Presuppositions are contents associated with certain lexical items or constructions
(triggers) which are typically felt to be backgrounded information, and which display
characteristic projection behavior. First, the inference that the presupposed content
is true is generally licensed even when the trigger is embedded in a variety of
entailment-cancelling environments (Karttunen (1973)’s holes), such as questions,
antecedents of conditionals, or epistemic modals (and others falling under the ‘family
of sentences’ notion of Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 1990). Thus the inference
from (1a) that Mary used to do yoga is also licensed by the other variants in (1), in
contrast to the inference that Mary is not doing yoga now, which is merely considered
as a possibility or questioned:
(1) a. Mary stopped doing yoga.
b. If Mary stopped doing yoga, then Matthew will interview her for his story.
c. Did Mary stop doing yoga?
d. Mary might have stopped doing yoga.
Second, presuppositions characteristically fail to project—they are filtered, in Kart-
tunen’s terminology—when their content is entailed by the trigger’s local context.
We leave informal the notion of local context here; it can be spelled out in various
ways (our question—whether filtering is symmetric or asymmetric—of course bears
directly on the question of how to characterize local contexts).2 Thus none of the
complex sentences in (2) as a whole presuppose that Mary used to do yoga:
(2) a. If Mary used to do yoga, then she stopped (doing yoga).
b. Mary never used to do yoga, or else she stopped (doing yoga).
c. Mary used to do yoga, and she stopped (doing yoga).
In some cases, this is obvious: e.g. (2a) and (2b) clearly do not license the inference
that Mary used to do yoga. In other cases, such as (2c), things are more subtle,
2 See Karttunen 1974; Stalnaker 1974; Heim 1983 for classic treatments, and Schlenker 2009 for
important recent work. For accounts not based on the notion of local contexts see Schlenker 2008b;
Fox 2008; Chemla 2008; George 2008 among others.
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since (2c) does license the inference that Mary used to do yoga. But this inference
arguably does not have the status of a presupposition, as witnessed by its behavior
when embedding (2c) in a presupposition hole, as in (3a): the inference that Mary
used to do yoga is no longer supported by this sentence, contrary to what we would
expect if it were a presupposition of the antecedent, (2c). This contrasts with the
minimal variant in (3b), where the other conjunct is unrelated to the presupposition,
and where the inference that Mary used to do yoga does project.
(3) a. If Mary used to do yoga and she stopped (doing yoga), then Matthew will
interview her for his story.
b. If Mary lives in Boston and she stopped doing yoga, then Matthew will
interview her for his story.
These examples show that material to the left of a given presupposition trigger
is taken into account in filtering its presupposition. The question we are concerned
with in this paper is whether the material to the right can also be taken into account.
We will focus on conjunctions, so our question is: can right conjuncts play a role
in filtering the presuppositions of left conjuncts, or only vice versa? The standard
assumption in the literature has been that filtering across conjunction is exclusively
left-to-right, based on contrasts like that between (4a) (which has a presupposition
trigger in a right conjunct, with the presupposition filtered by the left conjunct)
versus (4b) (which reverses this order) (Stalnaker 1974; Karttunen 1974; Heim 1983
among others):
(4) a. Mary used to do yoga and she stopped doing yoga.
b. # Mary stopped doing yoga and she used to do yoga.
But, as discussed by Chemla & Schlenker (2012); Rothschild (2008, 2011/2015)
a.o., it is not entirely clear what such contrasts show. (4b) is certainly marked, and
one explanation for this could be that presuppositions must be filtered by material
which appears to the left of their trigger, as in (4a). The presupposition in (4b)
would consequently project and be the source of the sentence’s markedness. But this
explanation does not suffice, since presupposition triggers can appear, to a certain
extent, in contexts that do not support them, in which case the presupposition is
commonly accommodated, as in (5) asserted out of the blue:3
(5) Mary stopped doing yoga.
The infelicity of (4b), and its contrast with (4a), thus is likely to (at least in part)
have an explanation in terms of independent factors. And, indeed, an independent
3 For the notion of accommodation see von Fintel 2008 and references therein.
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explanation is ready at hand. (4b) has the structure ⌜Sp and p⌝ (where Sp is a sentence
which presupposes p). There is something marked about roughly parallel cases that
don’t involve presuppositions of the form ⌜p+ and p⌝ (where p+ is a sentence which
entails, but is not entailed by, p), as we can see in the contrast between (6a) and (6b):
(6) a. John is a college student, and he is majoring in English.
b. # John is majoring in English, and he is a college student.
Theories of redundancy (following Stalnaker 1978) capture this contrast based
on the idea that we generally want our contributions to conversation to incrementally
augment the common information as they proceed (see Schlenker 2008a, 2009; Katzir
& Singh 2013; Mayr & Romoli 2016 among others). In the case of conjunction, this
requirement is applied to each conjunct separately, such that the second conjunct
has to add information relative to the first, which accounts for the contrast above:
sentences of the form ⌜p and p+⌝ are compatible with the requirement (in a null
context); sentences of the form ⌜p+ and p⌝ are not. Assuming that Sp entails p—or
that the constraint invoked here otherwise takes into consideration presupposed
content in some manner—the same explanation extends to cases of the form ⌜Sp and
p⌝, such as our (4b) above. Thus it is not clear that the relative infelicity of (4b) as
compared with (4a) tells us anything about presupposition projection, as opposed to
something more general about redundancy.
To circumvent issues about redundancy, we can modify our test paradigm slightly,
following Rothschild 2008, 2011/2015; Chemla & Schlenker 2012. So far, we have
contrasted sentences of the form ⌜p and Sp⌝ versus ⌜Sp and p⌝, where Sp is a sentence
which presupposes p. Instead, however, we can contrast sentences of the form ⌜p+
and Sp⌝ with sentences of the form ⌜Sp and p+⌝(where Sp does not entail p+), as in
(7):
(7) a. Mary used to do Jivamukti yoga and she stopped doing yoga.
b. Mary stopped doing yoga and she used to do Jivamukti yoga.
This paradigm circumvents issues about redundancy, because p+ adds something
beyond Sp (and likewise Sp adds something beyond p
+); thus, on the basis of issues
about redundancy alone, there should be nothing wrong with conjunctions of p+
and Sp in either order. And indeed, strikingly, the contrast in felicity observed in
(4a) versus (4b) above is intuitively far less clear in (7), if it exists at all, suggesting
that that contrast was at least in part driven by redundancy, and not presupposition
projection.
Does this show, then, that presupposition projection across conjunction is in fact
symmetric? Not at all. It simply controls for one orthogonal issue affecting felicity
judgments. The apparent relative felicity of (7b) could be due to symmetric filtering.
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But it could also result from felicitous accommodation of the presupposition. To
determine whether presupposition projection across conjunctions is symmetric,
we need to push further by testing whether presuppositions project equally out of
constructions with the form of (7a) and (7b). This question cannot be answered
by looking at simple conjunctions, since the presupposition can be licensed as an
inference for both orders (e.g. both orders entail that Mary used to do yoga), given
the logical nature of conjunction and the potential of accommodation. Instead, we
again need to embed these sentences further under presupposition holes, e.g. in the
antecedents of conditionals as in (3a), and see what projects (cf. Rothschild 2008,
2011/2015):
(8) a. If Mary used to do Jivamukti yoga and she stopped doing yoga,
then Matthew will interview her for his story.
b. If Mary stopped doing yoga and she used to do Jivamukti yoga,
then Matthew will interview her for his story.
The crucial question now is whether (8b) licenses the inference that Mary used
to do yoga. Given the uncontroversial existence of left-to-right filtering, (8a) is
expected to not support the inference, in line with what we already observed for
(3a). If right-to-left filtering is possible, then (8b) should follow the same pattern,
suggesting that presupposition filtering is symmetric. If—on the contrary—there is
no right-to-left filtering, then the presupposition from the first conjunct, that Mary
used to do yoga, should project. Note that the order-based asymmetry in the latter
case could be categorical or gradient in nature, i.e., right-to-left filtering could turn
out to not exist at all, or merely be less readily available than left-to-right filtering.
While teasing these possibilities apart empirically is a tall order, this has substantial
consequences for weighing various theoretical options, which we will turn to in the
general discussion of the experimental results. For the time being, the unqualified
use of ‘asymmetry’ in more descriptive prose below includes both these possibilities,
with occasional caveats and comments as needed.
In evaluating the key data points, there is a final confound which we must be
careful to control for: namely, the possibility of local accommodation.4 In certain cir-
cumstances, presuppositions fail to project; e.g. (9) has a coherent, if slightly marked,
reading, where the incompatibility of the last part forces a non-presuppositional
reading of the first:
4 A phenomenon sometimes also referred to as presupposition suspension. ‘Local accommodation’
comes from Heim 1983, where it is used to talk about a particular model of the phenomenon in which
presuppositions fail to project in cases we expect them to; following much of the subsequent literature,
we use it here as a name for the phenomenon without making a commitment to any particular model
of the phenomenon.
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(9) Mary didn’t stop doing yoga—she never did yoga to begin with!
Local accommodation in general encompasses cases in which presuppositions trig-
gered in entailment-canceling environments that generally exhibit projection, like
negation and antecedents of conditionals, do not wind up as inferences supported by
the utterance as a whole. In assessing the filtering properties of complex sentences,
it is thus crucial to distinguish failure to project due to local accommodation from
failure to project due to filtering, either left-to-right or right-to-left. As we discuss
below, our experimental design accomplishes this by including a control condition
that only allows for local accommodation, thus providing a baseline relative to which
any separate effects of filtering can be assessed.
In sum, our question is whether, after controlling for issues of redundancy—by
strengthening the non-presuppositional conjunct—and for local accommodation, we
find a difference in the availability of projection out of the antecedents of conditionals
of the form ⌜If p+ and Sp, then q⌝ (like (8a)) and ⌜If Sp and p+, then q⌝ (like (8b)),
respectively. If so, this would be support an asymmetric perspective; if not, it would
support a symmetric approach.
One option at this juncture is to consult our own intuitions, and there is some
precedent for this in the literature; Rothschild (2008, 2011/2015), for instance,
reports that in his judgment, there is no projection from either sentences of the
form (8a) or those of the form (8b). But, as Rothschild (2011/2015) himself notes,
intuitions here are quite subtle—too subtle, it seems to us, to settle without a more
systematic empirical assessment, using an experimental approach. Recent work
(Chemla & Schlenker 2012; Schwarz 2015) has investigated left-to-right and right-
to-left filtering experimentally and we come back to compare their results to ours in
the general discussion below. What is important for now is that these studies have
not looked at conjunction directly. In light of this, we conducted three experiments
collecting speaker judgments with the aim of ascertaining whether, and to what
extent, there is projection from sentences with these forms. The first two experiments
use an inference task, and yield results that confirm the existence of asymmetries,
but also give rise to new questions about what exactly is being measured. The
third experiment uses acceptability judgments, which provide further evidence for
asymmetry—even in contexts where right-to-left filtering would rescue an otherwise
infelicitous assertion—and also helps us home in on the notion of projection relevant
to the theory of presupposition.
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3 Experiment 1
3.1 Design
The first two experiments explored our central question using an inference task.
Participants read a sentence and were asked whether they would draw a given
inference from that sentence. In the critical trials, the sentence had the form of a
conditional whose antecedent contained a conjunction. We manipulated whether a
presupposition trigger appeared in the left or in the right conjunct of that conjunction.
(10) illustrates how these elements were phrased and displayed. Participants had
to indicate whether they would conclude that the proposition introduced by the
presupposition trigger (here, that Mary used to do yoga) holds by pressing ‘F’ or ‘J’.
(10) a. If Mary stopped doing yoga and she used to do Jivamukti yoga,
then Matthew will interview her for his story.
b. This leads me to conclude
c. Mary used to do yoga.
F J
Yes No
The rationale, following the logic laid out above for (3a) and (8), is that if the
presupposition introduced by the trigger projects, participants should reason that their
(fictional) interlocutor took its truth for granted, and correspondingly endorse the
inference that it holds. On the other hand, if it fails to project (due to filtering or local
accommodation), its truth should be taken as hypothetical since the presupposition
would only contribute to the antecedent of the conditional, rendering the inference
as unwarranted. By manipulating conjunct order (Conj-Ps-First as in (8a) vs. Conj-
Ps-Second as in (8b)), we tested for (a-)symmetry in filtering. If only preceding
material can filter the presupposition of a given trigger, filtering will only be available
when the trigger appears in the second conjunct. By contrast, if both preceding and
subsequent material can filter presuppositions, then we would expect filtering to be
available in both conjunct orders. As discussed above, this could still yield a gradient
asymmetry, if right-to-left filtering turned out to be less generally available, or it
could be categorically symmetric.
Given the caveat that, in principle, lack of projection can either be due to filtering
or to local accommodation, absolute inference rates do not suffice to establish the
presence or absence of filtering. To control for this, our design also included variants
of test items as in (11), with a simple, non-conjunctive, presuppositional antecedent.
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(11) SimplePs:
If Mary stopped doing yoga, then Matthew will interview her for his story.
Controls like (11) provide a baseline for projection. The only thing that could prevent
projection from a sentence like (11) would be local accommodation. Therefore rates
of projection out of sentences like this one will provide a baseline for projection in
the task. To the extent that the critical variants with conjunctive antecedents exhibit
the use of an additional mechanism to prevent projection, namely filtering, this
should be reflected in relatively lower inference endorsement rates than in the simple
control variants, where the only mechanism that could prevent projection is local
accommodation.
At the other extreme, we also included a baseline for non-projection in the form
of conditionals with simple non-presuppositional (Simple-No-Ps) antecedents like
(12). This establishes how likely participants were to infer that content introduced in
the antecedent would hold, even in the absence of presuppositional expressions.
(12) Simple-No-Ps:
If Mary used to do yoga, then Matthew will interview her for his story.
All existing accounts predict that filtering is obligatory whenever possible, and thus
that if filtering is asymmetric, then there will be no difference in inference rates
between Conj-Ps-Second and Simple-No-Ps.5
3.2 Materials, Procedure, and Participants
We created 32 critical items which came in four variants corresponding to the four
conditions described above. (13) provides a schematic illustration. The question
associated with these items was always whether it would lead participants to conclude
p.
(13) a. If Sp and p
+, then q. Conj-Ps-First (8a)
b. If p+ and Sp, then q. Conj-Ps-Second (8b)
c. If Sp, then q. Simple-Ps (11)
d. If p, then q. Simple-No-Ps (12)
Four counter-balanced lists of items were created, so that participants saw eight
repetitions in each of these four conditions, while only seeing each item in one
version. We used four different presupposition triggers to create the items: aware
5 Though in DRT accounts, this is just a stipulation (namely, that we always find local “antecedents”
for presuppositions whenever possible), and so is in a sense separable from the rest of the theory’s
commitments.
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(that), happy (that), stop, and continue. As a result, each participant saw two different
trials in each condition per trigger. We also included 48 filler items. 12 of them were
structurally identical to (13a) and (13b) but asked participants whether they inferred
p+ (rather than p); 12 were structurally identical to (13c) but asked participants
whether they inferred q. 16 filler items were structurally parallel to (13a) and (13b)
but had non-presuppositional embedding expressions (hope (that), doubt (that), try
(to), plan (to)) and asked participants whether they inferred p, p+ or q. Finally, 8
filler items consisted of non-conditional, conjunctive sentences of various forms and
asked participants whether they inferred one of the conjuncts. See the Appendix for
a list of all items.
Participants started the experiment with two practice trials where the separate
elements in the display were revealed step by step, with tool-tips explaining the
nature of the task: they were invited to imagine that a given sentence (corresponding
to (10a)) was produced by a fictional interlocutor and to indicate whether they would
conclude that a relevant statement (≈(10c)) held based on what their interlocutor said.
The practice trials were designed as clear cases of endorsement and non-endorsement
of the conclusion (using (non-)entailments of an unembedded conjunction and
disjunction respectively), and feedback on their responses provided through tool-tips
reinforced the notion that the fictional interlocutor should be deemed reliable. An
archived version of the experiment can be accessed online at [LINK REDACTED FOR
ANONYMOUS PEER REVIEW]
We recruited 50 native English speakers online from the participant pool of
Prolific.ac. They were rewarded £1.80 for their participation and took an average of
16 minutes to complete the task. They were distributed in four groups, following a
latin-square distribution of the four conditions over the 32 items, so that each item
appeared in each condition across participants in the data we collected.
3.3 Results
The graph in Figure 1 shows the mean inference endorsement rates in each of the
four critical conditions (see Appendix for detailed results in filler conditions). The
Simple-No-Ps and Simple-Ps conditions serve as baseline and ceiling comparisons
respectively. As expected, the inference endorsement rate is low for the former
and high for the latter, though there is some noise, presumably due to the relative
complexity of the task. (In addition, the rates for Simple-Ps may be lowered due
to a latent possibility of local accommodation.) Crucially, the critical condition
with the trigger in the first conjunct (Conj-Ps-First) is on par with Simple-Ps, while
the inference endorsement rate is lower when the trigger is in the second conjunct
(Conj-Ps-Second), though—somewhat unexpectedly—higher than in the baseline
Simple-No-Ps condition.
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Figure 1 Mean inference rates of p per condition in Experiment 1
In order to assess these effects statistically, we conducted analyses using mixed-
effect logistic regression models (lme4 version 1.1-13; R version 3.3.3) predicting the
observation of a ‘Yes’ answer as a function of Condition (Conj-Ps-First vs. Conj-Ps-
Second vs. Simple-Ps vs. Simple-No-Ps). The models included random intercepts for
participants and items (but no random slopes, due to failures to converge). Given that
accuracy on basic fillers (the conjunctive ones, see Fillers (d) and (e) in Appendix)
was close to ceiling throughout, we didn’t remove any data points for purposes of
analyses. We found significant differences between every pair of conditions (all
p’s< 0.001) except between Conj-Ps-First and Simple-Ps (p = 0.315). Additional
details on the statistical results are provided in the Appendix.
3.4 Discussion
With regards to our central question of (a-)symmetry, we found significantly lower
rates of inference endorsement in Conj-Ps-Second than in the projection baseline
Simple-Ps, and we found a significant effect of conjunct order on inference endorse-
ment rates, with higher rates in Conj-Ps-First than in Conj-Ps-Second. Together,
these findings provide evidence, first, for the (uncontroversial) claim that a left-to-
right filtering mechanism is available, since left-to-right filtering should lead to fewer
inference endorsements in Conj-Ps-Second than in Simple-Ps. Second, they provide
evidence for the claim that left-to-right filtering is more available than right-to-left
filtering, directly confirming a gradient asymmetry, as there are relatively higher
rates of endorsement in Conj-Ps-First than in Conj-Ps-Second. Moreover, the lack of
a significant difference between Conj-Ps-First and the projection baseline provided
by Simple-Ps (with numerically higher inference endorsement rates in the former)
suggests that there is no effect of right-to-left filtering in our task. This suggests
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that filtering is not only more available in Conj-Ps-Second than in Conj-Ps-First,
but that it is possibly not available at all in Conj-Ps-First, in line with a categorical
asymmetry where filtering is exclusively left-to-right.
A rather surprising aspect of our results is that while the inference endorsement
rates for Conj-Ps-Second were significantly lower than for Conj-Ps-First, they
also were significantly higher than in the non-projection baseline control provided
by Simple-No-Ps. Given that the standard theoretical assumption is that filtering,
when available, always takes place, finding any amount of projection judgments
in a configuration where filtering is clearly available is unexpected. While we are
not in a position to fully explain this aspect of our data here, we note that there
are potential factors that could bear on this independently of the nature of the
projection mechanism. The most obvious possibility is that participants failed to
perceive the entailment relationship between the non-presuppositional conjunct and
the presupposition.6 In that case, filtering would not be expected regardless of order.
If variation in entailment comprehension is solely responsible for the effect, this
finding would be compatible with standard assumptions after all, but of course
there may be other factors at play as well. Be this as it may, we will argue that
our third experiment, which looks at acceptability judgments rather than inference
tasks, succeeds at abstracting away from whatever factors other than projection may
increase inference endorsement rates in an inference task, and thus provides a more
direct assessment of projection.
Returning to our main question, while our results are in line with asymmetric
accounts of filtering, alternative explanations of the observed contrast in inference
endorsement based on conjunct order should be considered as well. A first potential
concern is that two of the triggers employed (aware and happy) were in principle
open to syntactic ambiguity, so that the second conjunct in the Conj-Ps-First versions
could potentially be interpreted in the scope of the trigger (they could be interpreted
as ⌜. . .aware/happy that [p and p+]⌝, leading to projection of p+). Two points speak
against this being the sole driving factor in our results, if it has an effect at all: first,
the interpretation in question seems intuitively dispreferred, especially with a that
preceding the first conjunct but not the second, a format which we intentionally
adopted to at least partly counter this worry; e.g. ‘If Douglas is happy that Sharon
is moving to Africa and she is moving to Kenya, then he will help her with the
move’ doesn’t seem to have a natural interpretation on which Douglas is happy that
Sharon is moving to Kenya. Second, if this were the only factor responsible for the
observed asymmetry, the effect of order should not have been present for the other
two triggers (stop and continue), whose complement takes a verb ending in -ing,
6 The manipulations in our materials to create the entailment relationship were varied, and included the
use of lexical hyponomy (coffee vs. espresso), compounds (toys vs. toy cars), and world knowledge
(going to France vs. going to Paris). See the Appendix for the complete list of the items.
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with no option of an overt complementizer. But as can be seen in the graph showing
individual results by trigger in the Appendix, the asymmetry seems to be uniformly
present across all four triggers, so this worry is not substantiated by our data.
A second concern, however, is more serious. The format of the critical versions
of our sentences differs from the controls in that only the former had conjunctions in
the antecedent of the conditional, which leaves room for independent effects based
on conjunction that are unrelated to the presuppositions at play. For example, the
second conjunct could have received a parenthetical interpretation, as illustrated in
(14).
(14) a. If Mary stopped doing yoga—and she used to do Jivamukti yoga—, then
Matthew will interview her for his story.
b. If Mary used to do Jivamukti yoga—and she stopped doing yoga—, then
Matthew will interview her for his story.
(14a) sounds like a plausible utterance to us: parentheticals introduce information as
backgrounded, and the parenthetical conjunct (p+) in (14a) can naturally be inter-
preted as adding background details (outside of the conditional) to the information
in the antecedent, details that naturally can be seen as reinforcing the relevance of
the conditional. In contrast, the parenthetical conjunct in (14b) (Sp, which doesn’t
entail p+) does not lend itself to being seen as adding details to the first conjunct
in a parallel manner. Likely due to the lack of such an interpretation, this sentence
seems less felicitous to us under a parenthetical construal. Moreover, it’s clear that
no parenthetical interpretation of the first conjunct of the antecedent is possible.
So a parenthetical construal is only available in our Conj-Ps-First sentences. And
this construal would favor endorsing the inference that p holds. Given the lack of
availability of such a construal for the Conj-Ps-Second sentences, this could be
responsible for the contrast in inference endorsement rates based on conjunct order
in our data. If this were so, then this contrast would not necessarily show that there
is an asymmetry in projection, with left-to-right filtering being more available than
right-to-left filtering; the apparent contrast could rather be the result of at least some
inference endorsements in the Conj-Ps-First condition being due to parenthetical
interpretations. This worry is further corroborated by an inspection of the filler items
(see Appendix for detailed results): one set of fillers was entirely parallel to the
experimental items but asked about p+ (the other conjunct), and yields an order
effect as well, suggesting that even the non-presupposed p+ is endorsed some of the
time, and more so when the presupposition trigger conjunct comes first. A second
set of fillers used conjunctions with non-presuppositional embedding verbs. While
these were not rigorously controlled in relevant ways, and the data was more limited
in that only some of these asked whether p (as opposed to p+ or q) could be inferred,
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they also yielded at least suggestive evidence that there could be some asymmetries
in endorsements of p even in the absence of a presupposition trigger.
In order to control for these potential alternative explanations in terms inde-
pendent of the properties of presupposition projection, we conducted a second
experiment. The key change was for our critical items to systematically include
control variations where the presuppositional expressions were replaced by struc-
turally similar non-presuppositional ones, while leaving the conjunctions untouched
otherwise.
4 Experiment 2
4.1 Design
Experiment 2 was a simple variation of Experiment 1, in that the control variations
of the critical items now comprised versions where the presuppositional verbs were
replaced by non-presuppositional ones, yielding non-presuppositional sentences
with either conjunct order Conj-No-Ps-First (⌜If S(p) and p+, then q⌝, where S(p)
is a sentence which embeds but does not presuppose p) and Conj-No-Ps-Second
(⌜If p+ and S(p), then q⌝). This manipulation allowed us to control for potential
conjunct-order effects independent of the presuppositional component, such as the
one considered above. Since the new control items didn’t contain presupposition
triggers, the inference rates observed in these conditions provide a baseline for any
effects independent of presupposition filtering. Thus, if there are general order effects
present in both presuppositional and non-presuppositional sentences, any additional
presupposition-based asymmetries should be reflected in even greater order effects
for the presuppositional variants. In other words, the asymmetry hypothesis that left-
to-right is more available than right-to-left filtering predicts a statistical interaction
between Embedding Type (Ps vs. No-Ps) and Order (First vs. Second).
4.2 Materials and Participants
The materials from Experiment 1 were adapted slightly to allow for minimal varia-
tions including the new controls, building on the format of non-presuppositional filler
items from Experiment 1, but implemented more systematically and as a within-
item variation. Each presupposition trigger was paired with a non-presuppositional
expression as follows to maximize plausibility in all embedding verb variants while
leaving the remainder of the sentences unchanged: happy (that)/hope (that), aware
(that)/sure (that), stop/frown on (V-ing), continue/enjoy (V-ing). (15) lists the re-
sulting 4 conditions. (16) illustrates the Conj-No-Ps-Second version of our running
example (8).
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(15) a. If Sp and p
+, then q. Conj-Ps-First
b. If p+ and Sp, then q. Conj-Ps-Second
c. If S(p) and p+, then q. Conj-No-Ps-First
d. If p+ and S(p), then q. Conj-No-Ps-Second
(16) If Mary used to do Jivamukti yoga and she frowns on doing yoga,
then Matthew will interview her for his story.
As before, 32 critical items in four versions were counter-balanced across four
lists, so that each participant would see 8 repetitions of each critical condition. A
full list of critical stimuli is provided in the Appendix. In addition, there were 32
filler items taken directly from Experiment 1, namely 16 presuppositional fillers
with complex antecedents where an inference based on the consequent or the non-
embedding conjunct had to be assessed, as well as 8 presuppositional fillers with
a simple antecedent (with an inference about the consequent), and 8 conjunctive
fillers, 3 presuppositional, and 5 non-presuppositional (with varied inferences being
assessed). See the Appendix for Experiment 1 for illustrations. Finally, 16 filler items
were created in both Simple-Ps and Simple-No-Ps variations, so that each participant
saw 8 repetitions of each. These were adapted from the lexical materials used for
non-presuppositional fillers with complex antecedents from Experiment 1, and again
provided a point of reference for baseline and ceiling in terms of supporting the crit-
ical inferences, while also controlling for local accommodation. An archived version
of the experiment can be accessed online at [LINK REDACTED FOR ANONYMOUS
PEER REVIEW].
We recruited 49 students (all self-reported native speakers of English) through the
Psychology Subject Pool at the University of Pennsylvania, who took the experiment
on a lab computer and received course credit for their participation.7
4.3 Results
The graph in Figure 2 shows the mean inference rates in the baseline (grey) and criti-
cal (orange and blue) conditions. As before, the fillers with simple (non-conjunctive)
antecedents provide points of reference for floor and ceiling levels, and pattern as
expected and virtually identically to Experiment 1. The critical presuppositional con-
junction conditions exhibit an order effect, with higher inference endorsement rates
when the trigger appears in the first conjunct, parallel to that in Experiment 1 as well.
The non-presuppositional conjunction controls also exhibit an order effect, although
7 Note that the replication of the results from Experiment 1, detailed below, thus validates the paradigm
across two populations.
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Figure 2 Mean inference rates of p per condition in Experiment 2
it seems to be weaker here. To assess these effects statistically, analyses parallel to
those for Experiment 1 above were conducted. Accuracy was high throughout so no
data were removed before analysis. Models predicting responses from the four criti-
cal conditions included two predictors, Embedding Type (Ps vs. No-Ps) and Order
(First vs. Second) and their interaction, as well as random intercepts for participants
and items, as well as random slopes to the extent that it was possible to include
them in terms of models converging while avoiding random effects correlations ap-
proaching 1 (see Appendix for details). Crucially, there was a significant interaction
between the two factors, as well as significant main effects (all p’s< .001; see Ap-
pendix for details). There also were corresponding significant simple effects of both
predictors (at all levels) (all p’s< 0.001, except for non-presuppositional order effect,
with p< .01; see Appendix for details). Additional models predicting responses from
the test and baseline conditions (between-item) included one four-leveled predictor
(Conj-Ps-First vs. Conj-Ps-Second vs. Simple-Ps vs. Simple-No-Ps), a random slope
for participants and random intercepts for participants and items. They revealed that
the contrast between Conj-Ps-First and Simple-Ps was not significant (p = 0.423)
but the one between Conj-Ps-Second and Simple-No-Ps was (p < 0.001), replicating
the pattern found in the main analysis for Experiment 1. Given the intermediate level
results for the non-presuppositional controls, we extended the same approach to
these as well, which revealed that for both orders, they were significantly different
from both Simple-Ps and Simple-No-Ps (p’s< .001).
4.4 Discussion
As in Experiment 1, we found evidence for asymmetry in the form of a significant
contrast between Conj-Ps-First and Conj-Ps-Second, replicating our web-based
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results there in a lab setting with college student subjects. However, the suspected
confound of general order effects, independent of presuppositionality, was also
substantiated to some extent, given the main effect of order and corresponding simple
effects for both Ps and No-Ps. But crucially, we also find a significant interaction
between Order and Embedding Type. This indicates that, while there is an order
effect of the kind we hypothesized about post-hoc in Experiment 1 (perhaps due
to parenthetical readings, perhaps due to some other mechanism), presuppositional
variants are subject to an additional factor that further enhances the order effect. The
most natural explanation of this is an asymmetry specific to presupposition filtering,
with left-to-right filtering being more available than right-to-left filtering.8
Once again parallel to the findings of Experiment 1, inference rates were com-
parable in Conj-Ps-First and Simple-Ps. Taken at face-value, this could be seen
as further substantiating the conclusion that there is no evidence for right-to-left
filtering in the present paradigm. However, the finding of a general, presupposition
independent order effect in the new data also opens up the possibility that right-
to-left filtering does have a presence in the data, but its effect is hidden by other,
non-presupposition-related inferences having to do with order effects (perhaps due
to parenthetical readings), which could add an independent boost here. Thus, while
the interaction effect between Order and Embedding Type clearly supports a gradient
asymmetry, the data from the first two experiments do not conclusively support a
categorical asymmetry.
An additional result is that we find further evidence for the somewhat surprising
effect for Conj-Ps-Second observed above: even in this condition, where left-to-
right filtering would be expected to be operative, there is an increase in inference
endorsements relative to baseline (Simple-No-Ps) and control (Conj-No-Ps-Second)
conditions. As before, this could be due to failure of perceiving the relevant entail-
ment relationship, but other, perhaps discourse-related factors, could be at play as
well, so further work is required to assess this otherwise theoretically surprising
finding more carefully.
Finally, another surprising result is that even non-presuppositional conjunctive
variants yield increases in inference endorsement rates, relative to simple (non-
conjunctive) non-presuppositional controls, and in both orders (and thus cannot be
solely attributed to a parenthetical reading of the kind suggested above). This raises
the question of what this should be attributed to. Possible explanations could allude to
latent or gradient presuppositionality of (at least some) of our non-presuppositional
8 Another relevant comparison concerns fillers of the same form as the Conj-Ps-. . . items, but where
the inference to be assessed corresponded to p+, which should be endorsed on a parenthetical reading.
These seem to exhibit an intermediate order effect, suggesting that to some extent, interpreting a
presupposition in the first conjunct as projecting may further enhance the availability of a parenthetical
reading.
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predicates, or to the somewhat particular discourse structure induced by the general
frame for our stimuli (with one conjunction containing an embedded clause, and the
other entailing that embedded clause). Before jumping to conclusions, it is important
to bear in mind that these effects could well be specific to the inference-task at hand,
and it is by no means clear that endorsing an inference in this paradigm should
automatically be seen as diagnosing the standard theoretical notion of projection.
We return to these questions in the discussion of Experiment 3, which adds further
perspective by employing a different kind of task (an acceptability task rather than
an inference task).
It is important to emphasize, however, that the confirmation of presupposition-
specific asymmetries through the statistical interaction above is independent of such
potential other effects. The results of Experiment 1 and 2 show that projection
across conjunction exhibits at least a gradient asymmetry: we have clear evidence
for left-to-right filtering, and no evidence for right-to-left filtering.
However, this leaves open the question of whether this asymmetry is merely
gradient or categorical. In particular, (Schlenker 2008a) introduces the notion that
left-to-right filtering is the default filtering mechanism, but that right-to-left filtering
can be called upon as a kind of rescue strategy. A proponent of a view like this
could point out that there were no sufficient contextual pressures in Experiments 1
and 2 that would promote right-to-left filtering, and thus that these experiments are
consistent with a hypothesis on which right-to-left filtering is in principle available,
but only when it is forced or facilitated by contextual pressures.
To ascertain whether this is so, we conducted a third experiment, which is based
on a similar paradigm to Experiment 1 and 2 in terms of the stimuli, but uses an
acceptability task rather than an inference task. In particular, we present the critical
sentences in different contexts, which either establish that p is true, or establish
explicit ignorance on part of the speaker, i.e., that the speaker does not know whether
p is true. An interpretation on which p projects should be fully acceptable in the
former context, whereas it should lead to unacceptability in the latter context, since
the speaker can’t coherently simultaneously declare her ignorance about p and
communicate that p is taken for granted. Moreover, a context like this is precisely the
kind of context where speakers would presumably resort to any rescue mechanisms
which are available to them to interpret the speaker as rational and cooperative.
Thus, if right-to-left filtering were available as a rescue mechanism, we would
expect to find it when subjects assess a conditional of the form ⌜If Sp and p+, then
q⌝ in contexts in which the speaker has made it explicit that she is ignorant about
whether p is true; and thus we would expect to find higher acceptability ratings
in this case than in the corresponding control of the form ⌜If Sp, then q⌝ in the
same context (once again, it is important to control acceptability ratings to this
baseline in order to distinguish right-to-left filtering from local accommodation). If
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by contrast we find no such effect, this would suggest that filtering across conjunction
is categorically asymmetric, such that right-to-left filtering is not available even as a
rescue mechanism.9
5 Experiment 3
5.1 Design
The third experiment adapted the stimuli from the previous studies but utilized
an acceptability task: before the critical conditional sentences, participants saw a
brief context sentence, and then assessed the sentence’s naturalness. The critical
stimuli were as in Experiments 1 and 2: conditional sentences with a conjunction
in their antecedent, of the form ⌜If p+ and Sp, then q⌝ and ⌜If Sp and p+, then q⌝.
Control conditions used non-presuppositional variants, as in Experiment 2, which
only differed from the presuppositional critical items in having non-presuppositional
sentence-embedding verbs broadly similar in meaning to those employed in the
presuppositional variants (i.e., sentences of the form ⌜If p+ and S(p), then q⌝ and⌜If S(p) and p+, then q⌝); a second control consisted of conditionals with non-
conjunctive antecedents, containing either presuppositional or non-presuppositional
embedding predicate. The second crucial manipulation varied the context, in that
we manipulated whether the provided contexts supported the critical content p or
explicitly made clear that the speaker was ignorant about whether p. (17) provides
an illustration of how these elements were phrased and displayed. Participants had to
indicate how natural the sentence was in the given context on a 7-point scale ranging
from ‘completely unnatural’ to ‘completely natural’.
(17) Mary always was involved in a lot of sports, but I don’t know whether she
ever did any yoga. If Mary used to do Jivamukti yoga and she stopped
doing yoga, then Matthew will interview her for his story.
Completely unnatural ◯◯◯◯◯◯◯ Completely natural
Thus this design has three critical factors: Order (-First vs. -Second, as in Experi-
ments 1 and 2), Embedding Type (Ps vs. No-Ps, as in Experiment 2), and Context
(Explicit Ignorance vs. Support). The addition of the final factor aims to create suffi-
cient contextual pressure to allow any potential evidence for right-to-left filtering to
emerge, even if it may otherwise be dispreferred. In particular, the Explicit Ignorance
contexts should lead to infelicity in the Conj-Ps-First condition if the presupposition
projects, but this infelicity can be avoided via right-to-left filtering if it exists (as
well as local accommodation, which we control for separately, as before).
9 Thanks to [REDACTED FOR ANONYMOUS PEER REVIEW] for providing the impetus for the general
direction of this follow-up.
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5.2 Materials and Participants
We adapted the materials from Experiments 1 and 2, consisting of conditionals
embedding in their antecedents conjunctions containing presuppositional and non-
presuppositional expressions, in either conjunct order. The resulting 4 target sentence
variations, schematically represented in (18), now appear preceded by a linguistic
context which either supports the potentially projecting content p or expresses
explicit ignorance of it, by either conveying p or explicitly stating I don’t know
whether p.
(18) a. If Sp and p
+, then q. Conj-Ps-First
b. If p+ and Sp, then q. Conj-Ps-Second
c. If S(p) and p+, then q. Conj-No-Ps-First
d. If p+ and S(p), then q. Conj-No-Ps-Second
(19) and (20) illustrate the Conj-(No-)Ps-Second version of our running example in
a SUPPORT versus EXPLICIT IGNORANCE contexts, respectively.
(19) Mary always was involved in a lot of sports, and she used to do yoga, too.
If Mary used to do Jivamukti yoga and she {stopped / now frowns on}
doing yoga, then Matthew will interview her for his story.
(20) Mary always was involved in a lot of sports, but I don’t know whether she
ever did any yoga.
If Mary used to do Jivamukti yoga and she {stopped / now frowns on}
doing yoga, then Matthew will interview her for his story.
In addition, within-item variants of the Simple-Ps and Simple-No-Ps conditions (with
a non-presuppositional predicate in place of the presuppositional one) again provided
a baseline comparison taking into account the possibility of local accommodation.
(21) illustrates the two versions for the running example, which were paired with the
same SUPPORT and EXPLICIT IGNORANCE CONTEXTS as above.
(21) If Mary {has stopped / now frowns on} doing yoga, then Matthew will
interview her for his story.
24 critical items in a total of 12 versions were created (see Appendix for more
detailed information on the stimuli), crossing Antecedent Type (First vs. Second
vs. Simple), Embedding Verb (Ps vs. No-Ps), and Context (Support vs. Expl-Ign).
The latter two factors were implemented as between-subject variations, i.e., the
stimulus-variants were divided into 4 subsets to be assigned to different groups of
participants; for each subset, three counter-balanced lists were created, so that each
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participant would see each item in one version, and overall see 8 items in each of the
three Antecedent Type versions within the relevant subset across items. Making two
of these factors between-subjects served a number of purposes. First, it allowed us to
keep the total number of critical items seen reasonable, despite the many variations
per item. Second, precluding participants from seeing both presuppositional and
non-presuppositional variants aimed to avoid any potential confusion or noise due
to lack of attention to the particular verb seen in a given trial; it also aimed to
prevent strategic effects and insights into the manipulation from arising. Similar
concerns arose for the context manipulation, though note that through the fillers,
detailed below, each participant did see some variety of contexts throughout the
entire experiment. This was not fully balanced, as we preferred to keep the filler
variations identical across all groups, for the sake of comparability and uniformity.
Two types of filler items were added to get additional baselines for (un-)acceptability.
The first consisted of variants of the conjunctive fillers we used before, which now
contained a presupposition trigger that would also interact with the context manipula-
tion. (22) provides an illustration. Crucially, the lack of any further embedding takes
projection out of the equation, and thus most importantly provides a baseline for how
unacceptable the presuppositional items are in Explicit Ignorance contexts. 16 such
items were included, with contexts varied evenly within items across participants.
(22) Anna recently got married,. . .
i. . . . and is expecting a baby. (Acceptable Context)
ii. . . . but I don’t know whether she’s going to have kids.
(Unacceptable Context)
Gerald is happy that Anna is pregnant and he will buy her a present
The second type of filler consisted of non-presuppositional conditional sentences
with a simple, non-conjunctive, antecedent. For these, the context manipulation plays
on the standard assumption that if -clauses must express information that is not at the
time commonly believed to be false, i.e., they have to introduce open possibilities.
The variants of the supportive contexts here violated this condition, in that they
established some proposition p, while the if -clause contained the negation of p
(putting the negation in the antecedent of the conditional allowed us to make the con-
texts fully parallel to those for the critical items); in contrast, the explicit ignorance
contexts were fully in line with this requirement. (23) provides an illustration.
(23) Ethan is planning a trip,. . .
i. . . . and he’ll go to England first. (Unacceptable Context)
ii. . . . but I don’t know whether he’s coming to England.
(Acceptable Context)
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Figure 3 Mean acceptability ratings by context and condition in Experiment 3
If Ethan isn’t coming to England, then Olivia will invite somebody else for
dinner
16 such fillers were included, again with contexts evenly varied within items across
participants, such that all participants saw at least 16 equivalents of Support contexts,
and 16 equivalents of Expl-Ign contexts, regardless off which type of context their
group was assigned to for the critical items.
We recruited 126 students (all self-reported native speakers of English) through
the Psychology Subject Pool at the University of [Redacted for peer review], who
took the experiment on a lab computer and received course credit for their partic-
ipation. An archived version of the experiment can be accessed online at [LINK
REDACTED FOR ANONYMOUS PEER REVIEW ]
5.3 Results
The mean acceptability ratings for critical conditions are illustrated in Figure 3,
separately for Expl-Ign and Support contexts. The outermost gray bars within each
subplot show the effect of context on the simple, non-conjunctive control conditions.
As expected, the non-presuppositional variants on the right are not affected by the
context manipulation. By contrast, the Simple-Ps condition exhibits low ratings
for the Expl-Ign context, but high ratings for the Support context, establishing
the effectiveness of the methodology. Next, the non-presuppositional conjunctive
conditions, just right of the middle in the respective panels, also do not seem to
exhibit any variation by context or, for that matter, conjunct order. Turning to the
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critical conditions, the conditions with the trigger in the second conjunct also seem
comparably acceptable across contexts. Only when the trigger is introduced in the
first conjunct does context seem to matter, with lower ratings in the Expl-Ign context.
Indeed, the ratings here seem on par with the Simple-Ps condition here, based on
visual inspection. Results for the filler conditions further confirm the effectiveness
of the overall approach of manipulating acceptability by varying contexts, with
generally even results across the various groups assigned to the different levels of
the two between subject-variables; see Appendix for more detailed illustration.
In order to assess the crucial comparisons statistically, we conducted linear
mixed effect model analyses using the lme4 package for R, with an overall parallel
approach to the logistic regression models for the previous experiments (specifically
with regards to choosing maximal random effect structures that would converge
while avoiding random effect correlations approaching 1). To assess all the factors
together, we first conducted a 3-way interaction analysis using treatment coding, with
Conj-Ps-First-Expl-Ign as the baseline. (See Appendix for full details on the model.)
Focusing on the conjunction comparisons, there is a significant 3-way interaction
(t = 3.09), showing that Order and Context interact differently for the Ps and No-Ps
conditions. In addition, there were corresponding significant 2-way interactions
at the relevant baseline levels: for the Expl-Ign conditions, there was a significant
interaction between Order and Embedding Type (t = 5.80); for the presuppositional
conditions, a significant interaction between Order and Context (t = 6.56); and for
the First conditions, with the embedding predicate in the initial conjunct, a significant
interaction between Embedding Type and Context (t = 3.39). While t-values greater
than 2 can already be seen as indicators of statistical significance, we also ran three
2×2 interaction analyses with centered predictors on the relevant subsets of the
data (i.e., successively selecting data corresponding to the baseline level of each
predictor), using model comparisons to obtain p-values as indicators of significance;
all three 2-way interactions were significant here as well (p’s< .01); see Appendix for
details. Turning to the more detailed nature of these 2-way interactions, they are all
driven by the Conj-Ps-First-Expl-Ign condition yielding lower acceptability than the
other conjunction conditions; this is confirmed in the 3-way intearction analysis by
significant simple effects relative to Conj-Ps-Second-Expl-Ign (t = 10.31), reflecting
asymmetry; relative to Conj-No-Ps-First-Expl-Ign (t = 4.33), showing that the effect
is specific to Ps; and relative to Conj-Ps-First-Support (t = 5.86), confirming the
effect of Context. Finally, and importantly, there was no significant difference relative
to the Simple-Ps-Expl-Ign condition (β =−0.14, SE = 0.15, t =−0.94), i.e., having
a later conjunct support a presupposition has no effect on acceptability, as the result
is indistinguishable from that for sentences that merely contain the presuppositional
conjunct.
As a further point, it’s worth highlighting that the overall pattern is remarkably
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uniform across triggers (see graph showing results by trigger in Appendix for details).
While the acceptability of both Simple-Ps and Ps-First varies across triggers (with
particularly high acceptability for aware, presumably due to relative ease of local
accommodation for this trigger), the two conditions show comparable acceptability
levels in Expl-Ign for each of the triggers.
5.4 Discussion
This experiment provided further clear evidence for the existence of an order asym-
metry in presupposition projection from conjunction. Moreover, we found no ev-
idence in this experiment for the existence of a right-to-left filtering option that
becomes available when there is sufficient contextual pressure to utilize it, namely to
avoid infelicity. The existence of such an option would lead us to expect to find direct
evidence for right-to-left filtering in cases where the projecting content conflicts with
explicit statements of ignorance provided in the preceding context. In such cases,
right-to-left filtering would provide a way to interpret the speaker as being coherent
and their utterance felicitous; without this option, the speaker will be interpreted as
incoherent and the utterance infelicitous. A set-up like this seems ideally suited for
invoking a pragmatic rescue mechanism of this sort. Yet, in the present acceptability
task, subjects’ acceptability judgments did not distinguish between the trigger-first
condition (sentences of the form ⌜If Sp and p+, then q⌝ ) and the control presup-
position condition (sentences of the form ⌜If Sp, then q⌝), finding both to be quite
unacceptable. That suggests that the only rescue mechanism available here is local
accommodation, not right-to-left filtering.10
Of course, non-existence arguments pose a tall order, and we still cannot rule out
with absolute certainty that right-to-left filtering does exist and can be invoked in
some circumstances other than those we tested. However, the absence of evidence for
right-to-left filtering even in the set-up given in Experiment 3, which was designed
to introduce maximal contextual pressure to call on right-to-left filtering, is at least
strongly suggestive that right-to-left filtering just not being a possibility at all for
conjunction. In other words, the final experiment provides support for categorical
asymmetry in filtering across conjunction.
Our results here also help answer two questions raised by the previous two
experiments. First, the non-presuppositional controls in the acceptability task provide
no evidence for projection of any kind: there were no significant differences between
acceptability judgments in the support vs. ignorance contexts. This is exactly in line
with expectations from the point of view of a traditional distinction between triggers
and non-triggers. Likewise, we saw no evidence in this case for projection from
10 As noted above, the availability of local accommodation seems to vary somewhat between triggers,
but importantly, the two mentioned conditions pattern together uniformly for all triggers.
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trigger-second presuppositional conditions, again, exactly in line with traditional
theories on which we would expect the presupposition to be completely filtered in
those cases. For reasons we discuss further below, we take this to provide evidence
that the surprisingly high inferences observed above, both in the non-presuppositional
controls, and in the trigger-second condition, are evidence of some kind of defeasible
pragmatic inference or defeasible failure to draw the relevant inferences, possibly
encouraged by the nature of the inferential task, that can—and should be—be
distinguished from presupposition projection.
Second, above we raised the possibility that our lack of evidence for right-to-
left filtering came from the interaction of (i) real right-to-left filtering for some
trials together with (ii) projective parenthetical readings, having nothing to do with
presupposition projection, for other trials, which together evened out to match
projection rates in the presuppositional control. Since in the present experiment we
found no evidence of projective parenthetical readings in the non-presuppositional
conditions (which would have led to a clash with the ignorance context but not with
the supporting context), we cannot explain away the lack of evidence for right-to-left
filtering here in the same way; and presumably this also counts as evidence against
that explanation in the first two experiments.
6 General discussion
6.1 The verdict on right-to-left filtering
The central question our experiments aimed to address was whether we find asym-
metry in presupposition projection from conjunction, i.e., whether the linear order of
a conjunct containing a presupposition trigger and another conjunct that entails the
relevant presupposition affects whether the presupposition projects, i.e., is present
for the entire conjunction.
We assessed this by embedding conjunctions of the form ⌜Sp and p+⌝ and ⌜p+
and Sp⌝ in the antecedents of conditionals, using both an inference task (Experiments
1 and 2) and acceptability judgments (Experiment 3) to ascertain whether subjects
took p to project out of such conditionals. Using p+ as the non-presuppositional
conjunct, rather than p, allowed us to control for issues of redundancy which Roth-
schild and others have pointed out confound some previous claims on this matter.
Comparing projection to both simple (non-conjunctive) presuppositional and non-
presuppositional baselines allowed us to control for local accommodation.
Taken together, our experiments show evidence for asymmetry in projection
across conjunction. In all three experiments, we found evidence for lower rates of
projection from sentences of the form ⌜p+ and Sp⌝ than for sentences of the form⌜Sp and p+⌝. The second experiment, moreover, showed that this is not just due
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to general order effects independent of presuppositionality: while we did, some-
what intriguingly, find evidence for such general order effects for both presuppo-
sitional and non-presuppositional predicates, they do not suffice to account for the
presupposition-specific order effect in the first two experiments. At least in this
paradigm, then, this provides evidence that left-to-right filtering is much easier to
access than right-to-left filtering, i.e., that there is at least a gradient asymmetry in
presupposition projection from conjunction. Moreover, we were unable to find any
evidence for right-to-left filtering at all, even when we set up the context to promote
use of right-to-left filtering as much as possible in Experiment 3: in no case did
projection from sentences of the form ⌜Sp and p+⌝ turn out lower than projection
from simple presuppositional sentences of the form ⌜Sp⌝, i.e., the existence of a
later conjunct that could in principle support or filter the presupposition made no
difference at all in our results. While we of course cannot rule out with absolute cer-
tainty the possibility that some evidence for right-to-left filtering across conjunction
could still turn up in other experimental paradigms, this provides pro tanto evidence
that, when it comes to conjunction, only left-to-right filtering is available, i.e., that
projection from conjunction is categorically asymmetric.
6.2 Methodological implications for investigating presupposition projection
There were two surprising aspects in the results of our first two experiments: first,
even in variants where the presupposition was introduced in the second conjunct,
inference rates were higher than in simple baseline conditions, suggesting, in descrip-
tive terms, that left-to-right filtering was not operative as consistently as expected
based on standard theoretical accounts. This could be due to various task-specific
effects, which could be followed up on in various ways, though it’s not clear that
any theoretically important issues are at stake (recall that one simple explanation
would be that the entailment relation between conjuncts was not always sufficiently
transparent). The second surprising finding, which at first sight may seem to be of
more immediate theoretical relevance, was that we also find increased inference
endorsement rates for controls with non-presuppositional embedding predicates
(such as be sure, enjoy, etc.) in Experiment 2. This finding is reminscent of recent
experimental reports of a gradient spectrum of projection effects across various
expressions, including both predicates that are traditionally considered presupposi-
tion triggers, and others that are not Tonhauser (2016); Tonhauser, Beaver & Degen
(2018). And at first sight, this aspect of our results could be taken to support the
hypothesis that the distinction between projective and non-projective content is much
less clear-cut than traditional work has assumed, with important implications for the
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nature and source of presuppositional content and its projective properties.11
The change-up in the task utilized in the third experiment, however, sheds
interesting further light on these two effects, as they were not replicated. There, the
critical condition in which the presuppositional or non-presuppositional sentence-
embedding conjunct came second yielded no difference between judgments of
acceptability based on context (Support vs. Expl-Ign). In other words, once we
looked at acceptability judgments rather than inference tasks, there no longer is
any indication of lack of left-to-right filtering or gradient projection from non-
presuppositional embedding predicates, i.e., everything behaved just as we would
expect it to from the point of view of traditional theories: sentences of the form ⌜If
p+ and Sp, then q⌝ or of the form ⌜If p+ and S(p), then q⌝ do not project p.
Descriptively speaking, we thus have a split verdict between the inference tasks
and the acceptability task, and in a sense, this is not surprising. It has been known
since Grice (1989)’s seminal work that inference is a multifarious thing, and can go
well beyond the truth-conditional or presuppositional content of a sentence. Thus the
fact that subjects tend to draw certain inferences from clauses appearing in embedded,
entailment-canceling environments, does not necessarily mean that the relevant
content has projected in the sense that students of presupposition should care about.
Crucially, we need a way to operationalize this latter notion. Arguably, acceptability
tasks give us just that. If subjects draw an inference just because it is a natural
conclusion to draw for any of a variety of pragmatic reasons short of entailment
or presupposition, then they will tend to relinquish that inclination when there is
pragmatic pressure to do so, as in the Explicit Ignorance contexts of Experiment 3.
By contrast, if the inference in question is a semantic presupposition, this will not
be a possibility: beyond the (marked) rescue mechanism of local accommodation,
subjects will not have an alternative to interpreting the presupposition at the utterance
level, and in turn seeing the utterance as infelicitous and the speaker as incoherent.
Thus comparing contexts which support the inference to contexts in which it has
been made clear that the speaker is ignorant about the inference provides a way
to distinguish a broad class of natural and invited pragmatic inferences from those
that are really encoded as presuppositions, and thus have no choice but to project.12
The theoretical upshot is that we should think twice before embracing a notion of
presupposition projection that is gradient based on results from inference tasks alone.
In methodological terms, we strongly recommend at least a two-pronged approach,
with careful attention paid to results stemming from the evaluation of acceptabilty in
11 Note, however, that other work with parallel tasks is more consistent with a traditional categorical dis-
tinction between triggers and non-triggers, while allowing for some pragmatic variation in projection
strength; see in particular Djärv & Bacovcin (2017).
12 Cf. a similar move made in Mandelkern 2016 in arguing against approaches to the Proviso Problem
on which non-conditional inferences are just pragmatic inferences, not semantic presuppositions.
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different contexts.
Of course, all this still leaves open questions about how to explain the other
pragmatic inferences. We will not try to account for this, but will make one sug-
gestion here, following Geurts & Pouscoulous 2009: sec. 2. It may well be that
inference tasks to some degree invite subjects to make the inference in question if it
is compatible with the assertion, since the content in question is right there before
the subjects’ eyes. This, for instance, might account for the projection observed
in inference tasks for sentences of the form ⌜If p+ and Sp, then q⌝, possibly in
combination with the suggestion above that subjects may fail to notice the relevant
entailment relation. That is, subjects may fail to observe the entailment between
p+ and p, and thus the fact that the presupposition fails to project, when they are
“invited” to infer that p is true by the stimulus. By contrast, in a context where the
inference to p will lead to unacceptability, subjects will be prompted to think more
carefully and will notice that p+ entails p and thus that the left conjunct filters the
presupposition of the right conjunct.
This idea is obviously tentative and requires further exploration. Let us empha-
size, however, that whatever we ultimately make of the surprising projection observed
in the inference tasks we believe that the fact that the acceptability judgments in
Experiment 3 are exactly in line with what traditional accounts predict—with no
projection from sentences of the form ⌜If p+ and Sp, then q⌝ or of the form ⌜If p+ and
S(p), then q⌝—provides substantial support for distinguishing real presupposition
projection from a variety of other pragmatic inference patterns.
6.3 Comparisons to previous work
Ours is not the first attempt to explore the (a)symmetry of projection behavior. In
this section we will briefly discuss how our results relate to those of a previous
study in Chemla & Schlenker 2012—a study whose conclusions pointed in different
directions from ours. Chemla and Schlenker’s study is the first experimental ap-
proach we know of to questions of (a-)symmetry in presupposition projection. They
employ both inferential and acceptability experiments to investigate the projection
of sentences in which a presupposition trigger appears either sentence-initially or
sentence-finally, with its presupposition being satisfied by material that preceded
or followed it, respectively. In particular, their inferential experiments looked at
(the corresponding French versions of) sentences like (24) versus (25), containing
a presupposition trigger (French aussi, ‘too’) and material that could plausibly be
taken to satisfy its presupposition, either preceding or following it. (In addition to
disjunctions like (24) and (25), they investigated corresponding conditionals and
unless-sentences.)
(24) Ann will not decide to study abroad, or her brother too will make a reasonable
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decision.
(25) Ann’s brother too will make a reasonable decision, or Ann will not decide to
study abroad.
If the non-presuppositional disjunct is interpreted as relating to the presuppo-
sition of too—which requires a small bit of fairly natural accommodation—then
these sentences can be taken to suggest that studying abroad would be a reason-
able decision for Ann. Chemla & Schlenker (2012) then measured to what extent
participants concluded the inferences in (26) and (27), the rationale being that if
the material from the non-presuppositional disjunct was considered, participants
would only conclude the weak inference in (26) (which contextually corresponds
to a conditional presupposition that is relativized to the other disjunct); conversely,
if the presupposition of the trigger were simply to project globally (with too being
related to Ann), they would conclude the strong inference in (27).
(26) Studying abroad would be reasonable for Ann.
(27) Ann will make a reasonable decision.
In their results, they found that the ‘conditional’ inference in (26) was preferred
in the canonical order, providing evidence that material that precedes the trigger is
indeed taken into account, as expected by any theory incorporating a form of left-to-
right filtering. More surprisingly, they also found that the conditional inference was
also endorsed more than the unconditional one in the inverse order, suggesting that
material that follows the trigger is also taken into account, thus supporting a theory
that also incorporates some form of right-to-left filtering.13
The study by Chemla & Schlenker (2012) was an important first step towards
addressing questions about (a-)symmetric effects in projection. There are two note-
worthy ways in which our approach goes beyond that of Chemla & Schlenker (2012).
First, Chemla and Schlenker did not look at conjunction, which, again, is taken as
the paradigmatic case for asymmetry. At this stage of inquiry, as we discuss further
in a moment, we must leave open the possibility that projection (a)symmetries differ
across connectives, and thus careful exploration of each connective is required.
And indeed, if we take both our results and those of Chemla and Schlenker at face
value, they point to a divergence of just this kind. Having said that, there is, sec-
ond, some reason to hesitate about taking Chemla and Schlenker’s results at face
value, which is that their study focuses on additive particles. The motivation for
this is to control for local accommodation, which is thought to be more difficult
with additive particles. But as Chemla and Schlenker themselves discuss, additive
13 Chemla & Schlenker (2012) did not investigate the potential interaction between type of inference
and order, which would be, in our mind, the most convincing measure of asymmetry.
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particles differ in their properties from other presupposition triggers in important
and relevant respects; in particular, these particles’ presuppositions project in quite
peculiar ways, as discussed in Soames 1979; Karttunen & Peters 1979; Chemla &
Schlenker 2012; Romoli 2012; Mandelkern & Romoli 2017b among others. Thus it
is not clear how far we can generalize conclusions about presupposition projection
in general from projection data concerning additive particles. Finally, note that the
main results reported by Chemla and Schlenker come from an inference task, which
comes with the complications discussed above. (They tried using an acceptability
task as well, but did not get conclusive results for that.) 14
7 Conclusion and further directions
Projection across conjunction has traditionally been taken to provide central evidence
that the mechanisms underlying presupposition projection in general are asymmetric.
Once we control for independent issues about redundancy, however, intuitive judg-
ments become much less clear, and the recent literature has been split on whether
projection across conjunction is asymmetric after all. Through carefully designed
experiments which control for issues of redundancy, as well as distinguishing fil-
tering from local accommodation, and using both inference and acceptability tasks,
we have found evidence that projection across conjunction is indeed asymmetric.
While this could be the case either gradiently or categorically, the acceptability task
in the last experiment provides at least strongly suggestive evidence for the latter
and stronger conclusion.
An important question which our results leave open concerns the (a-)symmetry
of other connectives. We cannot assume ex ante that the (a)symmetry properties
of projection is unifrom across different connectives, and indeed disjunction in
particular has frequently been claimed to exhibit right-to-left filtering, as exhibited
by examples like (28) (following Karttunen 1973 a.o.):
(28) Either Mary stopped doing yoga, or she never did yoga.
It’s clear that we do not infer from (28) that Mary used to do yoga, a fact which is
naturally taken as evidence that there is right-to-left filtering across disjunctions. But,
as for conjunction, care must be taken here to distinguish filtering from independent
pragmatic issues. (28) has the form ⌜Sp or not p⌝. If p projected from a sentence of
this form, we could then conclude Sp is true, making the right disjunct redundant.
So in cases like this, as has been observed since Gazdar 1979, there is independent
14 Schwarz (2015) also investigates (a-)symmetry in projection by using ‘again’ in antecedent-initial
vs. antecedent-final conditional sentences. His results are broadly comparable to those of Chemla &
Schlenker (2012). However, he also doesn’t look at conjunctions, and, again, there is a question as to
whether again brings in the same idiosyncratic issues brought in by too.
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pressure to locally accommodate the presupposition.15 This issue can be avoided, as
for conjunctions, by looking instead at sentences of the form ⌜Sp or not p+⌝, like
(29):
(29) Either Mary stopped doing yoga, or she never did Jivamukti yoga.
Here, as for conjunctions, judgments about projection become less clear, and experi-
mental work is needed to assess to what degree subjects will infer that Mary used to
do yoga from (29), and to what degree that differs from local accommodation. This
will allow us to clarify symmetry properties across different connectives. Finding
differences across connectives would pose a striking explanatory challenge, and
might suggest that the projection properties of connectives are encoded as a matter
of semantic convention (the line suggested by classic work in dynamic semantics
like Heim 1983). A uniform picture, by contrast, would be at least prima facie
more compatible with approaches which aim to explain projection properties in
non-conventional terms, like Schlenker 2008a; Rothschild 2011/2015.
Another important question which our discussion leaves open is the precise root
of the asymmetry which we have found evidence for. Is the asymmetry a matter of
linear order, as parsing-based approaches like Schlenker (2008a)’s would suggest, or
is it a matter of structure, as classical dynamic approaches would suggest (Chierchia
2009)? This is an important question for understanding where in the linguistic system
presuppositions are processed. Conjunctions, at least in languages like English, are
unlikely to help us answer this question, as linear and structural asymmetries coincide
here (on standard syntactic approaches); recent insight on this question has come
from cross-linguistic data (Ingason 2016; Chung 2017), as well as constructions in
English with flexible linear order, like conditionals (Mandelkern & Romoli 2017b,a).
Investigating (a-)symmetry in presupposition projection promises insights into
the architecture of one characteristic component of natural language. In addition, it
may inform theories of redundancy (which include both symmetric and asymmetric
versions, as noted above), anaphora, and epistemic modals (which are argued in
Mandelkern 2018 to be interpreted relative to an exclusively symmetric system of
local contexts). The study of these latter phenomena, likewise, may indirectly help
determine the best theory of presupposition projection. Many more new questions
are raised here than answered, but we hope that our experimental results, as well as
the paradigm we developed, advances our understanding of these subtle issues.
15 See Hirsch & Hackl (2014) for a proposal along these lines, as well as experimental data consistent
with the notion that with the trigger in the first disjunct, we are not dealing with right-to-left filtering
but pragmatically forced local accommodation. Hirsch, Zehr & Schwarz (2018) provide further
evidence for the viability of this account in terms of online processing time course based on visual
world eye tracking data.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Experiment 1 Details
8.1.1 Experimental Stimuli
Cricital Items
1.a. If Emily is happy that Jacob is in France and he is in Paris,. . . (Conj-Ps-First)
b. If Jacob is in Paris and Emily is happy that he is in France, . . . (Conj-Ps-Second)
c. If Jacob is in France, . . . (Simple-No-Ps)
d. If Emily is happy that Jacob is in France, . . . (Simple-Ps)
. . . then {she/Emily} will call him soon
2.If {(Emma is happy that Michael lives in Japan) [and] (he lives in Tokyo)}, then she will
go visit him
3.If Madison is happy that Joshua plays an instrument and he plays the piano, then she will
invite him to the party
4.If Abigail is happy that Matthew travelled to Germany and he travelled to Berlin, then she
will ask him to write a post on her blog
5.If Olivia is happy that Ethan is coming to England and he is coming to London, then she
will invite him for dinner
6.If Isabella is happy that Andrew plays a sport and he plays basketball, then she will ask
him to train with her
7.If Hannah is happy that Daniel sells flowers and he sells roses, then she will go buy flowers
from him
8.If Samantha is happy that Anthony designs clothes and he designs shirts, then she will ask
him to work for her
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9.If Ava is aware that Christopher smokes cigarettes and he smokes Marlboros, then she will
tell him about the recent class action suit
10.If Ashley is aware that Joseph likes music and he likes classical music, then she will give
him an anthology of Beethoven
11.If Sophia is aware that William likes musical instruments and he likes violins, then she
will ask him to play in her orchestra
12.If Elizabeth is aware that Alexander drinks soda and he drinks coke, then she will buy
some coke at the grocery store
13.If Alexis is aware that Ryan drives and he drives a Toyota, then she will get a ride from
him
14.If Grace is aware that David likes to eat out and he likes to eat at Mexican restaurants,
then she will not eat at home
15.If Sarah is aware that Nicholas eats meat and he eats pork, then she will bring her own
lunch
16.If Alyssa is aware that Tyler likes animals and he likes dogs, then she will ask him to
walk her dog
17.If Emily has stopped playing with toys and she used to have fun with toy cars, then Jacob
will buy her racing video games for her birthday
18.If Emma has stopped reading novels and she used to enjoy sci-fi novels, then Michael
will take her to the movies
19.If Madison has stopped drinking and she used to enjoy vodka, then Joshua will invite her
to his group
20.If Abigail has stopped doing yoga and she used to practice Jivamukti yoga, then Matthew
will interview her for his story
21.If Olivia has stopped going to the gym and she used to frequent the gym on campus, then
Ethan will ask her to train with him
22.If Isabella has stopped drinking coffee and she used to drink espresso, then Andrew will
suggest that she order tea
23.If Hannah has stopped skipping classes and she used to skip Physical Education, then
Daniel will not report her to the principal
24.If Samantha has stopped travelling to Italy and she used to go to Rome, then Anthony
will offer to take her on his next trip to Spain
25.If Ava continues visiting museums and she has been frequenting science museums, then
Christopher will have a lot to talk to her about
26.If Ashley continues watching sports and she has been watching baseball matches, then
Joseph will talk to her about the World Series
27.If Sophia continues going out to eat and she has been eating at expensive restaurants,
then William will get her a Wine and Dine magazine subscription
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28.If Elizabeth continues eating meat and she has been eating red meat, then Alexander will
not want to go out to eat with her
29.If Alexis continues failing exams and she has been flunking end-of-the-year exams, then
Ryan will not let her study abroad
30.If Grace continues hosting parties and she has been throwing massive parties, then David
will go live somewhere else
31.If Sarah continues adopting pets and she has been adopting cats, then Nicholas will
suggest she get a hamster
32.If Alyssa continues working in academia and she has been working for Harvard, then
Tyler will nominate her for the research committee
Fillers
a. Presuppositional fillers with complex antecedent (4 for each trigger; conjunct order varied
within item across participant groups):
If Shirley has stopped playing basketball and she used to be a WNBA player, then Juan
will ask her to teach basketball to disadvantaged kids in the summer
Inferences (varied within item across participant groups):
(c) Juan will ask Shirley to teach basketball to disadvantaged kids in the summer
(p+) Shirley used to be a WNBA player
b. Non-presuppositional fillers with complex antecedent (4 with hope, doubt, try and plan in
complex conjunct; conjunct order varied within item across participant groups):
If Hannah is trying to go study abroad and she is looking at universities in Canada, then
John will tell her about his experience
Inferences (varied within item across participant groups):
(c) John will tell Hannah about his experience
(p) Hannah is looking at universities in Canada
(p+) Hannah will go study abroad16
c. Presuppositional fillers with simple antecedent (2 for each trigger):
If Ralph has stopped working at night, then Pamela will invite him out for dinner
Inference:
(c) Pamela will invite Ralph out for dinner
d. Conjunctive fillers with presupposition (1 for each trigger except ‘continue’ (due to a
clerical error):
Kevin is happy that Nora is a musician - she’s a pianist - but he doesn’t like the music she
plays.
Inferences (varied within item across participant groups):
16 Note that the simple conjunct did not entail p for all items due to challenges in making the sentences
plausible.
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(c) Kevin doesn’t like the music Nora plays
(p) Nora is a musician
(p+) Nora is a pianist17
e. Conjunctive fillers with no presupposition (5 total):
Bill likes races, in particular horse races, but Scarlett doesn’t like sports involving animals
Inferences (varied within item across participant groups):
(conjunct 1) (p+)Bill likes horse races
(conjunct 1 (p))Bill likes races
(conjunct 2) (c) Scarlett doesn’t like sports involving animals
17 Note that the parenthetical did not entail p for all items due to challenges in making the sentences
plausible.
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8.1.2 Details of Results and Statistical Analysis
Planned comparisons . . . β SE z p
Conj-Ps-Second as baseline, vs.
Conj-Ps-First 1.68 0.21 8.01 < .001
Simple-Ps 1.47 0.21 7.15 < .001
Simple-No-Ps -2.28 0.22 -10.13 < .001
Conj-Ps-First as baseline vs.
Simple-Ps -0.21 0.21 -1.00 =.315
Simple-No-Ps -3.96 0.25 -15.77 < .001
Table 1 Estimated Coeffecients, standard errors, Wald’s z, and p-values from
logistic mixed effect model of the form (Answer == "Yes") ∼ condition
+ (1 | subject) + (1 + condition | item) for Experiment 1
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Figure 4 Mean inference rates of p per condition by Trigger in Experiment 1
8.2 Experiment 2 Details
8.2.1 Experimental Stimuli
Cricital Items
1.a. If Emily is happy that Jacob is in France and he is in Paris, then she will call him soon
b. If Jacob is in Paris and Emily is happy that he is in France, then she will call him soon
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Figure 5 Mean inference rates for fillers by inference type and conjunct order
(where applicable) in Experiment 1
c. If Emily was hoping that Jacob is in France and he is in Paris, then she will call him
soon18
d. If Jacob is in Paris and Emily was hoping that he is in France, then she will call him
soon
2.If Emma {is happy / was hoping} that Michael lives in Japan and he lives in Tokyo, then
she will go visit him
3.If Madison {is happy / was hoping} that Joshua plays an instrument and he plays the piano,
then she will invite him to the party
4.If Abigail {is happy / was hoping} that Matthew travelled to Germany and he travelled to
Berlin, then she will ask him to write a post on her blog
5.If Olivia {is happy / was hoping that} that Ethan is coming to England and he is coming to
London, then she will invite him for dinner
6.If Isabella {is happy / was hoping that} that Andrew plays a sport and he plays basketball,
then she will ask him to train with her
7.If Hannah {is happy / was hoping that} that Daniel sells flowers and he sells roses, then
she will go buy flowers from him
8.If Samantha {is happy / was hoping that} that Anthony designs clothes and he designs
shirts, then she will ask him to work for her
9.If Ava is {aware / sure} that Christopher smokes cigarettes and he smokes Marlboros, then
she will tell him about the recent class action suit
10.If Ashley is {aware / sure} that Joseph likes music and he likes classical music, then she
will give him an anthology of Beethoven
18 We delibarately chose the past tense was hoping that, as that seemed most natural to us for the
sentence as a whole.
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11.If Sophia is {aware / sure} that William likes musical instruments and he likes violins,
then she will ask him to play in her orchestra
12.If Elizabeth is {aware / sure} that Alexander drinks soda and he drinks coke, then she
will buy some coke at the grocery store
13.If Alexis is {aware / sure} that Ryan drives and he drives a Toyota, then she will get a
ride from him
14.If Grace is {aware / sure} that David likes to eat out and he likes to eat at Mexican
restaurants, then she will not eat at home
15.If Sarah is {aware / sure} that Nicholas eats meat and he eats pork, then she will bring
her own lunch
16.If Alyssa is {aware / sure} that Tyler likes animals and he likes dogs, then she will ask
him to walk her dog
17.If Emily {has stopped / frowns on} playing with toys and she used to have fun with toy
cars, then Jacob will buy her racing video games for her birthday
18.If Emma {has stopped / frowns on} reading novels and she used to enjoy sci-fi novels,
then Michael will take her to the movies
19.If Madison {has stopped / frowns on} drinking and she used to enjoy vodka, then Joshua
will invite her to his group
20.If Abigail {has stopped / frowns on} doing yoga and she used to practice Jivamukti yoga,
then Matthew will interview her for his story
21.If Olivia {has stopped / frowns on} going to the gym and she used to frequent the gym on
campus, then Ethan will ask her to train with him
22.If Isabella {has stopped / frowns on} drinking coffee and she used to drink espresso, then
Andrew will suggest that she order tea
23.If Hannah {has stopped / frowns on} skipping classes and she used to skip Physical
Education, then Daniel will not report her to the principal
24.If Samantha {has stopped / frowns on} travelling to Italy and she used to go to Rome,
then Anthony will offer to take her on his next trip to Spain
25.If Ava {continues / enjoys} visiting museums and she has been frequenting science
museums, then Christopher will have a lot to talk to her about
26.If Ashley {continues / enjoys} watching sports and she has been watching baseball
matches, then Joseph will talk to her about the World Series
27.If Sophia {continues / enjoys} going out to eat and she has been eating at expensive
restaurants, then William will get her a Wine and Dine magazine subscription
28.If Elizabeth {continues / enjoys} eating meat and she has been eating red meat, then
Alexander will not want to go out to eat with her
29.If Alexis {continues / enjoys} failing exams and she has been flunking end-of-the-year
exams, then Ryan will not let her study abroad
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30.If Grace {continues / enjoys} hosting parties and she has been throwing massive parties,
then David will go live somewhere else
31.If Sarah {continues / enjoys} adopting pets and she has been adopting cats, then Nicholas
will suggest she get a hamster
32.If Alyssa {continues / enjoys} working in academia and she has been working for Harvard,
then Tyler will nominate her for the research committee
8.2.2 Details of results and statistical analysis
Interaction Analysis . . . β SE z p
Interaction 0.98 0.28 3.56 < .001
Main Effect of Ps vs. No-Ps -1.41 0.16 -8.86 < .001
Main Effect of First vs. Second -1.25 0.21 -6.06 < .001
Table 2 Estimated Coeffecients, standard errors, Wald’s z, and p-values from
logistic mixed effect model of the form (Answer == "Yes") ∼ Ps * order
+ (1 + Ps + order | subject) + (1 | item), with centered predictors.
Simple Effect Analysis . . . β SE z p
Conj-Ps-First vs. Conj-Ps-Second -1.72 0.28 -6.24 < .001
Conj-No-Ps-First vs. Conj-No-Ps-Second -0.64 0.24 -2.66 < .01
Conj-Ps-First vs. Conj-No-Ps-First –1.89 0.25 -7.71 < .001
Conj-Ps-Second vs. Conj-No-Ps-Second -0.82 0.2 -4.07 < .001
Table 3 Estimated Coeffecients, standard errors, Wald’s z, and p-values from
logistic mixed effect model of the form (Answer == "Yes") ∼ Ps * order
+ (1 + Ps + order | subject) + (1 | item), with treatment coded predictors
and baselines adjusted for assessing respective simple effects.
8.3 Experiment 3 Details
8.3.1 Experimental Stimuli
1.a. Jacob has been traveling a lot, and he’s in France this week. If Emily is happy that Jacob
is in France and he is in Paris, then she will call him soon.
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Figure 6 Mean inference rates of p per condition by Trigger and No-Ps control
in Experiment 2
Support-Conj-Ps-First
b. Jacob has been traveling a lot, and he’s in France this week. If Jacob is in Paris and
Emily is happy that he is in France, then she will call him soon.
Support-Conj-Ps-Second
c. Jacob has been traveling a lot, and he’s in France this week. If Emily is happy that Jacob
is in France, then she will call him soon. Support-Simple-Ps
d. Jacob has been traveling a lot, but I’m not sure where he is this week. If Emily is happy
that Jacob is in France and he is in Paris, then she will call him soon.
Expl-Ign-Conj-Ps-First
e. Jacob has been traveling a lot, but I’m not sure where he is this week. If Jacob is in Paris
and Emily is happy that he is in France, then she will call him soon.
Expl-Ign-Conj-Ps-Second
f. Jacob has been traveling a lot, but I’m not sure where he is this week. If Emily is happy
that Jacob is in France, then she will call him soon. Expl-Ign-Simple-Ps
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Figure 7 Mean inference rates for fillers by inference type and conjunct order
(where applicable)
g. Jacob has been traveling a lot, and he’s in France this week. If Emily was hoping that
Jacob is in France and he is in Paris, then she will call him soon.
Support-Conj-No-Ps-First
h. Jacob has been traveling a lot, and he’s in France this week. If Jacob is in Paris and Emily
was hoping that he is in France, then she will call him soon. Support-Conj-No-Ps-Second
i. Jacob has been traveling a lot, and he’s in France this week. If Emily was hoping that
Jacob is in France, then she will call him soon. Support-Simple-No-Ps
j. Jacob has been traveling a lot, but I’m not sure where he is this week. If Emily was
hoping that Jacob is in France and he is in Paris, then she will call him soon.
Expl-Ign-Conj-No-Ps-First
k. Jacob has been traveling a lot, but I’m not sure where he is this week. If Jacob is in Paris
and Emily was hoping that he is in France, then she will call him soon.
Expl-Ign-Conj-No-Ps-Second
l. Jacob has been traveling a lot, but I’m not sure where he is this week. If Emily was
hoping that Jacob is in France, then she will call him soon. Expl-Ign-Simple-No-Ps
2.Michael has moved around a lot, and {currently lives in Japan / I’m not sure where he lives
at the moment}. If Emma {is happy / was hoping} that Michael lives in Japan and he lives
in Tokyo, then she will go visit him
3.Joshua has many hobbies, {and has been playing an instrument for a while / but I don’t
know whether he plays an instrument}. If Madison {is happy / was hoping} that Joshua
plays an instrument and he plays the piano, then she will invite him to the party.
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4.Matthew has been traveling in Europe, }and his last stay was in Germany / but I’m not
sure whether he went to Germany}. If Abigail {is happy / was hoping that} that Matthew
travelled to Germany and he travelled to Berlin, then she will ask him to write a post on
her blog
5.Daniel has opened a gift shop, {and also sells flowers / but I don’t know whether he sells
flowers}. If Hannah {is happy / was hoping} that Daniel sells flowers and he sells roses,
then she will go check out his store
6.Anthony is well-trained in arts and crafts, }and he also designs clothes / but I don’t know
whether he designs clothes}. If Samantha {is happy / was hoping} that Anthony designs
clothes and he designs shirts, then she will ask him to work for her
7.Christopher has various nervous habits, }and he smokes cigarettes / but I don’t know
whether he smokes}. If Ava is {aware / sure} that Christopher smokes cigarettes and he
smokes Marlboros, then she will tell him about the recent class action suit
8.Joseph is a big theater fan, {and he also likes music / but I don’t know whether he likes
music}. If Ashley is {aware / sure} that Joseph likes music and he likes classical music,
then she will give him a biography of Beethoven
9.William is a big fan of electronic gadgets, {and he also likes musical instruments / but I
don’t know whether he likes musical instruments}. If Sophia is {aware / sure} that William
likes musical instruments and he likes violins, then she will ask him to visit the musem of
musical instruments with her
10.Ryan loves riding motorcycles, { but he also drives / but I don’t know whether he drives}.
If Alexis is {aware / sure} that Ryan drives and he drives a Toyota, then she will get a ride
from him
11.David loves going to coffee shops, {and he also likes to eat out / but I don’t know whether
he likes to eat out}. If Grace is {aware / sure} that David likes to eat out and he likes to eat
at Mexican restaurants, then she will take him for Mexican
12.Tyler enjoys gardening, {and he also likes animals / but I don’t know whether he likes
animals}. If Alyssa is {aware / sure} that Tyler likes animals and he likes dogs, then she
will ask him if he knows anyone that could walk her dog
13.Emily used to enjoy boardgames, {and she also loved playing with toys when she was
little / but I don’t know whether she ever played with toys}. If Emily {has stopped / now
frowns on} playing with toys and she used to play with toy cars, then Jacob will buy her
racing video games for her birthday
14.Emma used to read a lot of poetry, {and she also used to read a novel a week / but I don’t
know whether she ever read any novels}. If Emma {has stopped / now frowns on} reading
novels and she used to enjoy sci-fi novels, then Michael will take her to a sci-fi movie
15.Abigail always was involved in a lot of sports, {and she used to do yoga, too / but I don’t
know whether she ever did any yoga}. If Abigail {has stopped / now frowns on} doing
yoga and she used to practice Jivamukti yoga, then Matthew will interview her for his story
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16.Isabella has always liked tea, {and she used to drink coffee, too / but I don’t know whether
she’s ever had coffee}. If Isabella {has stopped / now frowns on} drinking coffee and she
used to drink a lot of coffee, then Andrew will suggest that she order tea
17.Hannah never was the most diligent student, {and she used to skip classes / but I don’t
know whether she ever skipped any classes}. If Hannah {has stopped / now frowns on}
skipping classes and she used to skip French, then Daniel will not report her to the principal
18.Samantha is quite the globe trotter, {and she used to go to Italy quite regularly / but I
don’t know whether she’s ever been to Italy}. If Samantha {has stopped / now frowns on}
travelling to Italy and she used to go to Rome, then Anthony will offer to take her on his
next trip to Spain
19.Ava always liked going to churches, {and she’s also visited many museums / but I don’t
know whether she has ever been to a museum}. If Ava {continues / enjoys} visiting
museums and she has been frequenting science museums, then Christopher will have a lot
to talk to her about
20.Ashley always loved watching sitcoms, {and she also has been watching sports quite a bit
/ but I don’t know whether she’s ever watched any sports}. If Ashley {continues / enjoys}
watching sports and she has been watching baseball, then Joseph will invite her to watch
next year’s World Series with him
21.Sophia loves cooking exotic food, {and she used to go out to eat a lot / but I don’t know
whether she’s ever gone out to eat}. If Sophia {continues / enjoys} going out to eat and
she has been eating at expensive restaurants, then William will get her a Wine and Dine
magazine subscription
22.Elizabeth is a fish conoisseur, {and she also frequently eats meat / but I don’t know
whether she’s ever had meat}. If Elizabeth {continues / enjoys} eating meat and she has
been eating red meat, then Alexander will not want to go out to eat with her
23.Alexis is not a good student, {and recently she’s been failing exams / but I don’t know
whether she’s ever failed an exam}. If Alexis {continues / enjoys} failing exams and she
has been flunking end-of-the-year exams, then Ryan will suggest that she work with the
counselling center
24.Sarah loves animals, {and she has adopted pets quite often / but I don’t know whether
she’s ever adopted a pet}. If Sarah {continues / enjoys} adopting pets and she has been
adopting cats, then Nicholas will suggest she move out
Fillers
a. Non-Presuppositional fillers with simple antecedent (16 total, with contexts counterbal-
anced within item across participant groups):
i. Unacceptable Context (parallel to Support):
Ethan is planning a trip, and he’ll go to England first.
ii. Acceptable Context (parallel to Expl-Ign):
Ethan is planning a trip, but I don’t know whether he’s coming to England.
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If Ethan isn’t coming to England, then Olivia will invite somebody else for dinner
b. Presuppositional Conjunction fillers (16 total, varying triggers (4 for each trigger except
for continue, which was replaced by still in 3 out of 4 items to make the sentences more
natural; contexts were counterbalanced within item across participant groups):
i. Acceptable Context (parallel to Support):
Anna recently got married and is expecting a baby.
ii. Uncceptable Context (parallel to Expl-Ign):
Anna recently got married, but I don’t know whether she’s going to have kids.
Gerald is happy that Anna is pregnant and he will buy her a present
8.3.2 Details of results and statistical analysis
3-way Interaction Analysis . . . β SE t
Intercept 2.09 0.23 8.96
Second 1.57 0.15 10.31
Simple -0.14 0.15 -0.94
No-Ps 1.25 0.29 4.33
Support 1.66 0.28 5.86
Second:No-Ps 1.28 0.22 -5.80
Simple:No-Ps 0.44 0.22 2.01
Second:Context -1.31 0.22 -6.06
Simple:Context 0.80 0.22 3.67
No-Ps:Context -1.31 0.39 -3.39
Second:No-Ps:Context 0.96 0.31 3.09
Simple:No-Ps:Context -0.98 0.31 -3.16
Table 4 Estimated Coeffecients, standard errors, and t-values from linear mixed
effect model of the form Answer ∼ Order * Embedding Type * Context
+ (1 | Subject)+(1+Embedding Type * Context | Item), with treatment
coding and Conj-Ps-First-Expl-Ign as baseline.
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Order * Embedding Type Interaction . . . β SE t
Main effect of Order 0.96 0.18 5.34
Main effect of Embedding Type 0.61 0.27 2.28
Interaction -1.27 0.35 -3.59
Table 5 Estimated Coeffecients, standard errors, and t-values from logistic
mixed effect model of the form (Answer == "Yes") ∼ Embedding Type
* Order + (1 + Embedding Type | Subject) + (1 + Embedding Type *
Order | Item) with centered predictors, for conjunctive stimuli in the
Expl-Ign conditions. Model comparison for the interaction confirmed
its significance, with χ2 = 11.56, and p < .001
Order * Context Interaction . . . β SE t
Main effect of Order 0.92 0.17 5.43
Main effect of Context 1.00 0.25 4.09
Interaction -1.30 0.31 -4.21
Table 6 Estimated Coeffecients, standard errors, and t-values from logistic
mixed effect model of the form (Answer == "Yes") ∼ Context * Order
+ (1 + Order | Subject) + (1 + Context * Order | Item) with centered
predictors, for conjunctive stimuli in the Ps conditions. Model compari-
son for the interaction confirmed its significance, with χ2 = 15.53, and
p < .001
Context * Embedding Type Interaction . . . β SE t
Main effect of Context 1.01 0.20 5.09
Main effect of Embedding Type 0.59 0.23 2.55
Interaction -1.32 0.41 -3.23
Table 7 Estimated Coeffecients, standard errors, and t-values from logistic
mixed effect model of the form (Answer == "Yes") ∼ Embedding Type
* Context + (1 | Subject) + (1 + Embedding Type * Context | Item), with
centered predictors for conjunctive stimuli in the Expl-Ign conditions.
Model comparison for the interaction confirmed its significance, with
χ2 = 10.04, and p < .01
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Figure 8 Mean acceptability ratings per Context and Order by Trigger in Experi-
ment 3
49
Mandelkern, Zehr, Romoli, & Schwarz
Crit-Expl-Ign Crit-Support
0
2
4
Cond-No-Ps-Acc. Cond-No-Ps-Unacc. Conj-Ps-Acc. Conj-Ps-Unacc. Cond-No-Ps-Acc. Cond-No-Ps-Unacc. Conj-Ps-Acc. Conj-Ps-Unacc.
M
ea
n 
R
at
in
gs
Type of Critical Item Group No-Ps Ps
Figure 9 Mean acceptability ratings for fillers by type and between-subject factor
groups (Context and Embedding Type for critical items)
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